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CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
DETERMINING CONTROL UNDER SUBPART F
Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code' imposes income taxation upon
United States shareholders2 who own a majority of the voting power of a
foreign corporation.3 Certain income4 of such a "controlled foreign corpo-
ration" (CFC)5 is attributable to its United States shareholders for tax pur-
poses, without regard to whether the income is distributed.6 Many United
States shareholders, most of them American parent companies of foreign
subsidiaries, 7 seek to avoid s Subpart F and the severity of its tax burden.9
1. I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (originally enacted as the Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, §
12, 76 Stat. 960).
2. "United States shareholder" under Subpart F and as used in this Note is a term of art.
I.R.C. §§ 951(b) and 958 define a United States shareholder as a United States person who
owns or is considered to own at least 10 percent of the voting power of a foreign corporation's
stock. United States persons are defined as United States citizens, residents, partnerships, cor-
porations, estates, and trusts, with the exception of certain individuals who reside in United
States possessions. I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(30), 957(d). The rules of indirect and constructive stock
ownership, found in I.R.C. § 318(a) as modified by I.R.C. § 958, are stringent and complex.
See generally Bandy, Ways to Avoid Current Taxation of Subpart F Income, 52 TAXES 181,
182-83 (1974).
3. Subpart F provides that control of a foreign corporation hinges upon majority owner-
ship of voting power of all classes of stock by United States shareholders. I.R.C. § 957(a); see
note 28 infra and accompanying text.
4. I.R.C. § 95 1(a). Only certain types of income earned by a foreign corporation are tax-
able to its United States shareholders on their pro rata shares. These are the corporation's
Subpart F income, I.R.C. § 952, see note 31 infra, its previously excluded Subpart F income
withdrawn from investment in less developed countries, its previously excluded Subpart F
income withdrawn from foreign base company shipping operations, and its increase in earn-
ings invested in United States property, see note 32 infra.
5. I.RC. § 957(a). For the full text of this subsection, see note 28 infra.
6. I.R.C. § 951(a). The Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 201, 50 Stat. 813 (current version
at I.R.C. §§ 551-558), first introduced taxation of American shareholders upon their pro rata
shares of a foreign company's undistributed profits. The 1937 Act imposed a tax on American
shareholders of foreign personal holding companies. Its purpose was to curtail tax avoidance
through the use of "incorporated pocketbooks" abroad. See generally Paul, The Background
of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. CHi. L. Rav. 41, 49-50 (1937). For a discussion of the rela-
tionship between the foreign personal holding company provisions and Subpart F, see note 92
infra.
7. Wales, Tax Policy in Relation to Foreign Business Income, 40 TAXES 961, 965 (1962).
This Note will concentrate on problems arising from decontrolling American-controlled for-
eign subsidiaries to avoid Subpart F. The problem of retention of voting control is peculiar to
the decontrol situation and would not normally arise in the context of formation or acquisition
of a foreign corporation by an American parent corporation.
8. The Tax Court has upheld the propriety of attempts to avoid Subpart F taxation. See
Kraus v. Commissioner, 59 U.S. Tax Ct. 681, 692-93 (1973), aj'd, 490 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974);
note 121 infra and accompanying text.
9. The provisions of Subpart F are among the most restrictive of the Internal Revenue
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One method by which United States shareholder parent corporations can
escape the tax burden of Subpart F' 0 is to divest themselves of majority
control over their foreign subsidiaries."
United States shareholders who wish to avoid Subpart F by decontrolling
a foreign corporate operation need to know the degree of decontrol neces-
sary to accomplish avoidance, since they inevitably desire to retain as much
voting power and economic interest 12 in the foreign corporation as possible
without falling under Subpart F. Although the statutory definition of a
CFC rests on mathematical criteria,' 3 Treasury Regulation section 1.957-
l(b)(2),14 promulgated pursuant to Subpart F, may impose taxation on
United States shareholders who have transferred a significant degree of
control over a foreign corporation-enough to avoid CFC classification
under the statutory criteria.
This Note will examine the extent to which section 1.957-1(b)(2) is an
appropriate and accurate measure of United States shareholder control
over a foreign corporation. Several recent cases that apply the regulation' 5
Code dealing with the taxation of foreign income. Waris, Current Foreign Income Problems
Involving Subpart F and Related Statutes, 27 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx. 977, 977 (1969). If
enacted in its present form, President Carter's 1978 Tax Reform Program would increase
significantly the tax imposed upon CFC's. See President's Tax Message, Jan. 20, 1978, re-
printed in 124 CONG. REc. H62, H68 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1978). Falling under Subpart F
produces other problems besides taxation. For example, the administrative burden involved
in planning, auditing, and recordkeeping may be enormous, which provides additional induce-
ment for avoidance. See Gifford, Excess Distributions Under Section 963: Computation of the
Foreign Tax Credit, 26 TAx L. REv. 317, 317 (1971); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
357 (1962) (dissenting senators' views on H.R. 10650).
10. Originally, Subpart F contained several relief provisions which could potentially ease
the tax burden. See generally Munsche, Relie/Provisions in Section 12 of the Revenue Act of
1962, 41 TAXEs 53 (1963). Many of these provisions were eliminated by the Tax Reduction
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 602, 89 Stat. 26. See Note, The Effects of the 1975 Tax
Reduction Act on the Taxation of Subpart F Income, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNA''L L. 377 (1976).
11. Pehrson & Terr, Problems in the Acquisition and Disposition of a Foreign Subsidiary, 35
N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX. 511, 542 (1977). Pehrson and Terr stated that "reduction of U.S.
shareholder voting power in the foreign subsidiary to 50 percent or less offers a means of
avoiding [CFC classification]." Id. at 542.
12. The statutory provisions of Subpart F do not include the retention of economic interest
as a factor to be considered in the determination of control. See notes 87-99 infra and accom-
panying text. However, the treasury regulation promulgated pursuant to I.R.C. § 957(a) in-
troduces an economic interest factor for measuring control. See note 42 in/ra and
accompanying text.
13. The statutory test is "more than 50 percent" ownership of voting power. See note 28
infra.
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2) (1963).
15. There are five reported cases decided under section 957(a) and its regulations. They
are: Kraus v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974), ajf'g 59 U.S. Tax Ct. 681 (1973);
Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), a f'g 58 U.S. Tax Ct. 423 (1972),
cert. deniea 417 U.S. 911 (1974); Koehring Co. v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Wis.
1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2016 (7th Cir. Oct. 17, 1977); CCA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64
U.S. Tax Ct. 137 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1; and Weiskopf v. Commissioner, 64 U.S. Tax Ct.
78 (1975), a'dmem., 538 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1976).
SUBPART F
will provide a background for the discussion. The Note will then propose
an alternative approach to measuring United States shareholder control
under Subpart F which is more equitable, more precise, and more easily
applied.
SUBPART F
A. BACKGROUND AND GENERAL PURPOSE
Prior to 1962, the Internal Revenue Code did not subject United States
shareholders to taxation on foreign source income 16 realized by their for-
eign corporate holdings until the income was actually distributed to them as
dividends.1 7 Consequently, Americans who controlled a foreign corpora-
tion could indefinitely postpone paying tax on the corporation's income by
causing it to retain the entire amount of its earnings.' 8 This method of tax
deferral was widespread1 9 and produced many undesirable and inequitable
consequences. For example, American parent companies with foreign sub-
sidiaries could take advantage of this tax deferral, but wholly domestic
companies could not.20 Tax deferral thus encouraged U.S. investment
abroad and retention abroad of earnings realized by American-controlled
foreign corporations.21 Many American companies operating abroad
through foreign subsidiaries abused tax deferral by causing their sub-
sidiaries to accumulate profits by artificial means22---profits otherwise at-
tributable to the American parent. By directing a disproportionate share of
16. A foreign corporation is taxable on its United States source income under I.R.C. §§ 881-
882.
17. I.R.C. § 61 subjects U.S. taxpayers to taxation of dividend income when it is received.
Prior to 1962, earnings repatriated by liquidation or sale of stock rather than by dividend
distribution were taxable at preferential capital gains rates. I.R.C. § 1248 eliminates this loop-
hole by making certain gains from the sale of stock in a controlled foreign corporation taxable
at ordinary income tax rates. See Gifford, Controlled Foreign Corporations-Section 1248,
240 TAx MNGM'T PORTFOLIO (BNA) A-I (2d ed. 1975).
18. President's 1961 Tax Recommendations: He.arings on H 10650 Before the House
Comm on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]
(message from the President).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 29 (statement of Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon). United States
corporations are subject to current federal income taxation on income from foreign sources.
I.R.C. § 11.
21. Hearings, supra note 18, at 9-10 (message from the President).
22. Artificial arrangements such as intercompany pricing, transfer of patent licensing rights,
shifting of management fees, and transfer of distribution rights tended to maximize the income
attributable to the foreign subsidiary. Id. at 8; Kauder, Taxation of Domestically Controlled
Foreign Corporations: A Comparative Study of Subpart F and Section 482, 14 WAYNE L. REv.
260, 261 (1969). The Internal Revenue Service found it difficult to police such artificial ar-
rangements. Hearings, supra note 18, at 29 (statement of Secretary of the Treasury C. Doug-
las Dillon); Wales, supra note 7, at 972.
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profits to a subsidiary located in a "tax haven" country,23 the parent com-
pany could shelter this income from current U.S. taxation in favor of the
lower rates of the tax haven.24 Because of the adverse effects which tax
deferral of foreign corporate income had on the U.S. balance of payments25
and tax revenue,' 6 Congress, in 1962, added Subpart F to the Internal Rev-
enue Code.
27
B. CONTROL PROVISIONS OF SUBPART F
Section 957(a)28 of Subpart F defines a controlled foreign corporation as
any foreign corporation 29 of which more than 50 percent of the total voting
power of all classes of stock is owned directly or indirectly by United States
shareholders. 30 Subpart F requires United States shareholders to pay tax on
their pro rata shares of a CFC's "Subpart F income" 3 1 and certain other
23. The so-called "tax havens" are countries with very low domestic rates of taxation. The
two most popular tax havens were Panama and Switzerland. Other frequently used tax
havens were the Bahamas, Canada, Haiti, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, The Nether-
lands Antilles, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Kust, Controlled Foreign Corporations-Secion 9.5,
109 TAX MNGM'T PORTFOLIO (BNA) A-2 (2d ed. 1970).
24. Hearings, supra note 18, at 28 (statement of Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dil-
lon). In addition, companies could still, under I.R.C. § 901, credit income taxes paid abroad
against U.S. income tax liability. Hearings, supra note 18, at 30.
25. Secretary of the Treasury Dillon estimated that elimination of tax deferral for foreign
subsidiaries would improve the U.S. balance of payments by as much as $390 million per year.
He also estimated that net capital outflow to Western Europe between 1957 and 1960
amounted to $400 million and that net capital outflow to Canada during the same period
amounted to $200 million. Hearings, supra note 18, at 31-32 (statement of Secretary of the
Treasury C. Douglas Dillon).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1962).
27. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12, 76 Stat. 960. For a brief summary of the
legislative history of Subpart F, see O'Connor, United States Taxation ofAmerican-Controlled
Foreign Corporations, 42 TAXES 588, 601-07 (1964).
28. The subsection states:
For purposes of this subpart, the term "controlled foreign corporation" means any
foreign corporation of which more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote is owned (within the meaning of section 958(a)),
or is considered as owned by applying the rules of ownership of section 958(b), by
United States shareholders on any day during the taxable year of such foreign corpo-
ration.
I.R.C. §§ 957(b) and 957(c) set forth certain special circumstances which may exempt a foreign
corporation from CFC status. The most significant of these exceptions is that the term con-
trolled foreign corporation does not include any corporation created or organized in the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico or a possession of the United States, provided that a certain
percentage of the corporation's income is derived from sources within the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico or a possession of the United States. I.R.C. § 957(c). The purpose of this excep-
tion is to encourage investment in U.S. possessions. O'Connor, supra note 27, at 610.
29. "Foreign corporation" is defined as a corporation not organized or created in the United
States under the laws of the United States or any State or Territory. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-5
(1960).
30. For the definition of United States shareholders, see note 5 supra.
31. As defined in I.R.C. § 952(a), the Subpart F income of a controlled foreign corporation
is the sum of its income from the insurance of United States risks, as determined under I.R.C.
SUBPART F
income,32 thereby indirectly taxing the corporate income itself.33
In 1963 the Treasury Department promulgated a regulation pursuant to
section 957(a), the effect of which was to broaden the mathematical statu-
tory definition of a CFC. Section 1.957-1(b)(1) of the regulation 34 autho-
rizes attribution of voting power to United States shareholders where they
possess actual majority control of a foreign corporation's voting power,
even though they may lack a nominal majority of the voting stock. The
regulation permits consideration of "all the facts and circumstances of each
case" in determining whether the requisite degree of control is present.
35 If
United States shareholders have the ability to elect a majority of the board
of directors36 or can appoint the person whose vote decides deadlocks
among directors,37 the foreign corporation will be considered a CFC re-
gardless of whether United States shareholders formally control the voting
stock.
Under section 1.957-1(b)(2) of the regulation,38 any shift of voting power
away from United States shareholders will not be given effect if it is not
bona fide. The regulation sets forth two specific situations in which at-
tempts to transfer control will be invalidated. First, any express or implied
agreement that restricts the capacity of non-United States shareholders 39 to
§ 953, and its foreign base company income, as determined under I.R.C. § 954. Insurance
abroad of United States risks became popular after the passage of the Life Insurance Company
Income Tax Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-69, § 2(a), 731 Stat. 112 (current version at I.R.C. §§
801-820), which created a tax on underwriting gains. American companies attempted to
avoid such taxation by reinsuring their policies abroad or by placing the initial policies with
American-controlled foreign insurance companies, resulting in the Subpart F requirement that
United States shareholders include as income their pro rata shares of the income from premi-
ums received by a CFC for the insurance of United States risks. S. REP. No. 1881, supra note
9, at 81; O'Connor, supra note 27, at 610. The major part of Subpart F income, foreign base
company income, has four components: (1) foreign personal holding company income, (2)
foreign base company sales income, (3) foreign base company service income, and (4) foreign
base company shipping income. I.R.C. § 954(a). A discussion in detail of each component is
beyond the scope of this Note. Generally, foreign base company income includes items of
passive income such as dividends, interest, royalties and rents as well as certain types of sales
and service income. See O'Connor, supra note 27, at 611.
32. I.R.C. § 951(a) subjects United States shareholders to taxation on several other major
types of income. For instance, United States shareholders are taxed on their pro rata shares of
a CFC's previously excluded Subpart F income withdrawn from foreign base company ship-
ping operations, as determined under I.R.C. §§ 951(a)(3) and 955(a)(3), and on their pro rata
shares of a CFC's increased earnings from investments in United States property, as deter-
mined under I.R.C. § 956(a)(2). I.R.C. § 951(a).
33. I.R.C. § 951.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(1) (1963).
35. Id.
36. Id § 1.957-1(b)(1)(i).
37. Id. § 1.957-1(b)(1)(ii).
38. Id. § 1.957-1(b)(2).
39. Non-United States shareholders are either foreign shareholders, or American sharehold-
ers who do not own at least 10 percent of a foreign corporation's voting power and therefore
do not qualify as United States shareholders under I.R.C. § 951.
1978]
348 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:343
exercise their voting power independently will cause their voting stock to be
disregarded in determining control.4° Second, the regulation attempts to
prevent United States shareholders from retaining control by issuing multi-
ple classes of stock and transferring to non-United States shareholders
classes of stock that are subject to restrictions on voting power. To accom-
plish this objective, the regulation provides that the voting power held by
the non-United States shareholders will be disregarded if not exercised, and
if it is exercised, it will be attributed to the persons on whose behalf it is
exercised. 41 Application of this portion of the regulation-the "tri-test"-is
dependent upon the existence of the following three conditions: (1) the per-
centage of voting power held by non-United States shareholders must be
substantially greater than their proportionate shares of the corporation's
earnings; (2) the facts must indicate that the non-United States shareholders
do not exercise their voting rights independently; and (3) a principal pur-
pose of the arrangement must be to avoid CFC classification under section
957(a).42
II
JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE
CONTROL PROVISIONS
Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner43 and Kraus v. Commissioner,44 the two
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2) (1963). This portion of the regulation states:
Any arrangement to shift formal voting power away from United States shareholders
of a foreign corporation will not be given effect if in reality voting power is retained.
The mere ownership of stock entitled to vote does not by itself mean that the share-
holder owning such stock has the voting power of such stock for purposes of section
957. For example, if there is any agreement, whether express or implied, that any
shareholder will not vote his stock or will vote it only in a specified manner, or that
shareholders owning stock having not more than 50 percent of the total combined
voting power will exercise voting power normally possessed by a majority of stock-
holders, then the nominal ownership of the voting power will be disregarded in deter-
mining which shareholders actually hold such voting power, and this determination
will be made on the basis of such agreement.
41. Id.
42. Id. This portion of the regulation states:
Moreover, where United States shareholders own shares of one or more classes of
stock of a foreign corporation which has another class of stock outstanding, the voting
power ostensibly provided such other class of stock will be deemed owned by any
person or persons on whose behalf it is exercised, or, if not exercised, win be disre-
garded if the percentage of voting power of such other class of stock is substantially
greater than its proportionate share of the corporate earnings, if the facts indicate that
the shareholders of such other class of stock do not exercise their voting rights inde-
pendently or fail to exercise such voting rights, and if a principal purpose of the ar-
rangement is to avoid the classificaiion of such foreign corporation as a controlled
foreign corporation under Section 957.
43. 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), af'g58 U.S. Tax Ct. 423 (1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911
(1974).
44. 490 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974), aft'g 59 U.S. Tax Ct. 681 (1973).
SUBPART F
earliest cases to confront the issue of determining control under Subpart F,
were very similar factually. In each case the foreign corporation in ques-
tion was, prior to 1962, a wholly owned subsidiary of an American corpora-
tion. Upon the enactment of Subpart F, each foreign corporation issued a
special class of preferred stock which ostensibly transferred exactly 50 per-
cent of the voting power to non-United States shareholders.45 In both cases,
however, the preferred shares held by non-United States shareholders were
subject to several substantial restrictions on voting power,46 so that control
of the board of directors of the foreign corporation remained in the hands
of United States shareholders.47 Both Garlock and Kraus presented obvi-
ous arrangements whereby an American parent corporation attempted to
avoid Subpart F taxation while retaining actual voting control over its for-
eign subsidiary.48 Thus, the Second Circuit was understandably eager to
strike down these arrangements by characterizing them as sham transac-
tions.4
9
In each case the Second Circuit, although it upheld the tri-test's validity,
was not untroubled by this portion of the regulation. The Garlock court
relied solely on the tri-test, but was reluctant to speculate on the rule's ap-
plicability to facts less clearly indicative of retention of control by United
States shareholders.50 In Kraus, the court viewed the regulation even less
45. 489 F.2d at 198; 490 F.2d at 900.
46. For example, in Kraus the preferred stock of the foreign corporation was subject to call
by the board of directors on three months' notice, a power which if exercised would terminate
the existence of the preferred stock. 490 F.2d at 902. In Garlock the preferred shareholders
could "put" their stock under certain conditions; that is, they could demand repurchase at par
by the corporation. 489 F.2d at 199. In both cases the preferred stock was transferable only
upon the approval of the board of directors, while the common stock was freely transferable.
489 F.2d at 199; 490 F.2d at 900.
47. 489 F.2d at 199; 490 F.2d at 902. Retention of control of the board of directors was
especially significant since neither of the foreign corporations' articles of incorporation pro-
vided an adequate means of resolving shareholder deadlocks. 489 F.2d at 202; 490 F.2d at
902. This, combined with the limitations on the voting rights of the preferred shares, see note
46 supra, effectively precluded the preferred shareholders from gaining control of the board of
directors; the United States shareholders were in a position to stalemate any such attempt.
48. In each case the United States shareholders all but admitted their artifice. In Garlock, a
report approved by the foreign corporation's board of directors admitted a desire to issue the
preferred stock to passive investors so that Garlock would be "protected from loss of actual
control." 489 F.2d at 198 (quoting the report). In Kraus the preferred stock was transferred
to personal friends or business associates of the United States shareholders. 490 F.2d at 902.
49. Several articles examine the Garlock and Kraus decisions. See, e.g., Olsen, Planning to
decontrol a "CFC" after the Second Circuit's Garlock and Kraus decisions, 40 J. TAx. 144
(1974); Rado, "Decontrolling" a corporation to remove the controlled-foreign-corporation taint,
39 J. TA. 322 (1973).
50. The first sign of this reluctance surfaced in the Tax Court majority opinion in Garlock.
See 58 U.S. Tax Ct. at 436. In a concurring opinion, five judges expressed skepticism about
the regulation's universal validity, stating: "Given the particular fact situation involved herein
and the ultimate conclusion flowing therefrom, it remains for future decisions to determine
whether the totality of section 1.957-l(b)(2) of respondent's regulations is a valid implementa-
tion of the statutory provisions." Id. at 439 (concurring opinion). The Second Circuit upheld
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favorably, refusing to rely squarely on the tri-test. Instead, the court based
its holding on the totality of the circumstances, citing many factors which
when considered together established that the United States shareholders
had in fact retained voting control.
5 '
Other cases have struggled with the tri-test and have reached seemingly
inconsistent results in applying it. In practice, the tri-test often degenerates
into the Kraus "all the facts and circumstances" analysis.5 2 This reluctance
of the courts to give full force to the tri-test has produced judicial confusion
and unpredictability in determining control. In Weiskopf v. Commissioner
5 3
the Tax Court held that a foreign corporation was a CFC even though the
United States shareholders had transferred 50 percent of their voting stock
to foreign shareholders, since the foreigners could best serve their interests
by not disturbing United States shareholder control.5 4 Similarly, in Reve-
nue Ruling 70-426, 55 the Internal Revenue Service ruled that a foreign cor-
poration was a CFC where the United States shareholder, although owning
only 50 percent of the corporation's voting stock, could force a liquidation
of the corporation under applicable foreign law.5 6 Conversely, in CCA, Inc.
v. Commissioner,5 7 the same judge who wrote Weiskopf held that a 50 per-
cent transfer of voting power by United States shareholders was a success-
ful avoidance of CFC classification even though the court found that the
the application of the regulation, but hinted at the importance of Garlock's specific facts: "We
believe, however, that the regulation, as applied to the facts in this case, is proper .... 489
F.2d at 200.
51. 490 F.2d at 903. The Tax Court in Kraus speculated on the validity of the tri-test and
refused to base its holding specifically thereon: "[W]e do not pass on whether the tests further
elucidated in section 1.957-1(b)(2). . . are sufficient, in and of themselves, to find that voting
power was retained." 59 U.S. Tax Ct. at 696.
52. The totality of the circumstances approach is authorized by the regulation. Treas. Reg. §
1.957-1(b)(1) (1963); see text accompanying note 35 supra. But the elements of the tri-test
often become factors in this approach, as they did in Kraus.
53. 64 U.S. Tax Ct. 78 (1975), aj'dmem., 538 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1976).
54. The court concluded that because the non-United States shareholder held only a fixed
economic interest in the foreign corporation, he had no incentive to challenge United States
shareholder control. Furthermore, the United States shareholders controlled the source of the
foreign corporation's only product line and so could have brought business to a standstill at
any time. Although the foreign corporation was set up as a deadlock corporation, with voting
stock and board of directors representation evenly split between the two groups of sharehold-
ers, the court found that in reality the non-United States shareholder was powerless to alter the
corporation's affairs in any meaningful way. 64 U.S. Tax Ct. at 95.
55. Rev. Rul. 70-426, 1970-2 C.B. 157.
56. The foreign corporation's charter had a one year life that applicable foreign law re-
quired a 75 percent vote of the stockholders each year to renew. Id. The IRS's ruling ignores
the fact that neither group of shareholders had an advantage over the other with respect to the
power to force a liquidation. This type of true deadlock corporation, in which United States
shareholders own no more than 50 percent of the voting stock, should not be classified as a
CFC absent special circumstances which tilt control in their favor, as in Weiskopf, notes 53-54
supra and accompanying text. Eigner, Tax Planning Under Subpart F, in SIXTH ANNUAL
INsTrrUTE ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 30 (A. Kroll ed. 1975).
57. 64 U.S. Tax Ct. 137 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1.
SUBPART F
non-United States shareholders did not share equally in the corporation's
earnings or management.
58
The most recent decision to consider the meaning of control under sec-
tion 957(a) is Koehring Co. v. United States.5 9 This case involved the trans-
fer by Koehring Company, an American corporation, of a controlling block
of its voting stock in one of its foreign subsidiaries to Newton-Chambers &
Co., Ltd., a British corporation.60 Following World War II, Koehring and
Newton-Chambers had developed extensive business ties in the interna-
tional marketing of their heavy construction equipment products. 61 On sev-
eral occasions prior to the enactment of Subpart F, the companies had
discussed setting up a jointly owned corporation to increase their interna-
tional sales.62 In 1963, Newton-Chambers acquired newly issued preferred
stock constituting 55 percent of the voting stock of Koehring Overseas Cor-
poration (KOS), originally a wholly owned foreign subsidiary of Koeh-
ring.63 Soon after the completion of the voting stock transfer, the board of
directors of KOS was reconstituted. Newton-Chambers nominees filled
three positions of the five member board, including the chairmanship, while
Koehring nominees filled the remaining two.64
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that
KOS was a controlled foreign corporation despite Koehring's transfer of 55
percent of KOS's voting stock and Newton-Chambers' installation of a ma-
jority of directors. The court found that Newton-Chambers failed to exer-
cise its voting stock actively or independently, and that an implied
agreement existed between the parent companies requiring Newton-
Chambers to vote its stock in accordance with the desires of Koehring. The
court also found that all three of the conditions set forth in the tri-test were
satisfied.65 Under section 1.957-1(b)(2), either of these findings alone would
58. For a discussion of the CCA decision see notes 100-04 & 110 infra and accompanying
text.
59. 433 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Wis. 1977), appealdocketed, No. 77-2016 (7th Cir. Oct. 17, 1977).
60. Id. at 932-33.
61. Both Koehring and Newton-Chambers conduct worldwide sales and have several mar-
keting subsidiaries. In 1948, the two parent companies entered into a licensing agreement
whereby Newton-Chambers manufactured and sold products of Koehring design, concentrat-
ing its sales in the Eastern Hemisphere. In return, Koehring concentrated its marketing efforts
in the Western Hemisphere. Id. at 931.
62. Id. During this period, each company was somewhat dissatisfied with the other's per-
formance under the 1948 licensing agreement. These problems gave rise to discussions center-
ing on proposals to establish a cooperative sales venture. The chairman of Newton-Chambers
wrote to the president of Koehring to express his concern about the problems arising under the
licensing agreement and to urge that Newton-Chambers "have an equity stake in Koehring's
overseas ventures." Id. at 932.
63. Id. at 933. Meanwhile, to complete a planned cross-investment between the companies,
the Koehring group purchased more than 40 percent of the stock of a Newton-Chambers sub-
sidiary. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 935.
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The recent cases decided under section 957(a) have demonstrated that
courts will closely scrutinize attempts to avoid CFC classification by decon-
trolling a foreign subsidiary. 67 The Koehring decision, however, is the first
to apply section 1.957-1(b)(2) to a situation where United States sharehold-
ers actually held less than 50 percent-as opposed to exactly half-of the
voting stock of a foreign corporation. The Koehring court provided very
little reasoning in support of its determination that KOS was a controlled
foreign corporation. For example, the facts of Koehring are very similar to
those of CC4, but the Koehring court did not distinguish or even mention
the latter case.
Apart from the difficulty of ascertaining the Koehring court's reasoning,
there are weaknesses in the regulation itself that have become more appar-
ent by the court's sweeping application of the regulation. Neither the regu-
lation's implied voting agreement test nor its tri-test is a particularly
accurate measure of actual voting control. Furthermore, the tri-test is not
completely consistent with the congressional intent of section 957(a). These
two tests, each of which the Koehring court cited to justify its decision, will
be examined to determine their propriety, both on their face and as applied
in the section 957(a) cases.
A. IMPLIED AGREEMENT TEST
The first three sentences of section 1.957-l(b)(2) 68 deal with the elevation
of substance-actual voting control-over the nominal ownership of voting
stock.69 If a transfer of voting stock is merely an artifice or sham to escape
the quantitative definition of a CFC under section 957(a), a court may dis-
regard the transfer in determining control. This portion of the regulation
permits scrutiny of voting stock for express or implied agreements not to
66. See Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2) (1963); notes 34-42 supra and accompanying text.
67. Pehrson & Terr, supra note 11, at 542.
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2) (1963). For the text of this portion of the regulation, see
note 40 supra.
69. The regulation implements an important principle of taxation-that the substance of a
transaction will be elevated over its form if the statute was intended to encompass the sub-
stance. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1934) (corporate reorganization effected solely
to minimize taxable gain on the sale of property was a mere contrivance and was outside the
intent of the statute). Courts have often applied this principle to void fictitious transfers of
stock. See, e.g., Atkins v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 387 (5th Cir, 1935) (artificial stock transac-
tion held not a bona fide sale establishing a deductible loss); Hook v. Commissioner, 58 U.S.
Tax Ct. 267 (1972) (stock transfer must be bona fide and have economic reality).
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exercise voting power independently. A court may also consider similar de-
vices that could significantly affect ostensible voting power, such as restric-
tions on the stock itself 70 or a close relationship between United States and
non-United States shareholders.
71
Section 957(a) authorizes an examination of voting stock for possible in-
firmities: the statutory measure of control is actual or constructive owner-
ship of voting power, not merely a numerical count of voting stock.
Nonetheless, disregard of non-United States shareholder voting power on
the basis of an implied agreement72 should occur only where the weight of
the evidence shows that the voting stock is subject to voting restrictions or
qualifications.73 Reliance on factors that only vaguely indicate a voting
agreement or restrictions on voting power imparts too much discretion to
the judiciary.74
Koehring is the first decision under section 957(a) to rely on a finding of
an implied agreement, although the test was undoubtedly a factor in earlier
70. See, e.g., Kraus v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974); Garlock, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973).
71. See Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(c)(5) (1963); note 72 infra.
72. As a general rule, an agreement should not be implied unless there is a meeting of the
minds of the parties indicated by some intelligible conduct. In Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co.
v. United States, 261 U.S. 592 (1922), the Supreme Court stated that an implied agreement
should be "founded upon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an express
contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in light of the surrounding
circumstances, their tacit understanding." Id. at 598. See also Braun v. United States, 46 F.
Supp. 993 (Ct. Cl. 1942) (statement of account by the IRS was not under the circumstances
sufficient to give rise to an implied agreement to repay an overpayment of estate taxes); Kirk v.
United States, 451 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1971) (implied agreement inferred from the acts of the
parties or other circumstances showing an intent to contract).
Treasury Regulation § 1.957-1(c)(5) reveals the Treasury Department's view of what facts
are necessary to constitute an implied agreement. In the example given, a United States
shareholder owns 50 percent of the voting stock of a foreign corporation and a foreign share-
holder, the United States shareholder's lawyer, owns 2 percent. The other 48 percent is owned
by a foreign corporation. The foreigner places his stock certificates in a depository to which
the United States shareholder has access. The United States shareholder has frequently taken
the shares from the depository, and on one occasion used the shares as collateral. Although
dividends are paid directly to the foreigner, his charges to the United States shareholder for
legal services are reduced by the amount of dividends paid to him. These facts, according to
the regulation, indicate an implied agreement that the United States shareholder was to retain
dominion over the foreigner's voting stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(c)(5) (1963). This example,
however, differs significantly from the Koehring fact situation where the non-United States
shareholder (Newton-Chambers) owned not 2 but 55 percent of the voting stock, and the
United States shareholder (Koehring) had no control over that stock or its dividends.
73. In Handy & Harman v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 136 (1931), the Supreme Court suggested that,
in determining ownership of stock possessing voting rights, courts should look primarily to the
actual present percentage of voting rights as established by a corporation's articles of incorpo-
ration and only secondarily, if at all, to contingent voting rights, contractual arrangements or
other factors bearing on how voting power was actually exercised.
74. One commentator has suggested that since there is no statutory foundation for the inclu-
sion of an implied agreement test, only clear evidence that non-United States shareholders
have actually surrendered their voting power should suffice to trigger the application of
§ 957(a). Wars, supra note 9, at 988 & n.23.
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decisions.75 But the Koehring court failed to give specific reasons for its
finding that Newton-Chambers agreed not to exercise its voting power inde-
pendently.76 The court appears to have based this finding on its closely re-
lated determination that, under the tri-test, Newton-Chambers in actuality
failed to vote its stock independently. 77 Not only do the facts provide little
support for this conclusion,78 but even if it were valid it would not necessar-
ily prove the existence of an implied agreement. As a business reality,
stock possessing voting rights is often not actually voted;79 when it is voted,
the interests of each group of shareholders are often best served by voting
similarly.
80
Unless specific facts-other than a mere similarity of voting records
among shareholders-indicate that the parties truly reached some under-
standing affecting the capability of non-United States shareholders to exer-
cise their voting power, a court should not disregard nominal voting power
on the tenuous ground of an implied agreement. The implied agreement
test, which permits the examination of facts and circumstances indicating
actual weaknesses in ostensible voting power, should not be construed as
permitting a court to read restrictions into voting power where their exis-
tence is merely speculative.
B. THE TRI-TEST
The tri-test, which appears in the fourth and final sentence of section
1.957-1(b)(2), 8 1 addresses transfers of a separate class of voting stock to
75. For example, in Kraus the non-United States shareholders were friends, relatives, or
business associates who were not disposed to question corporate policy. 490 F.2d at 902. But
the case was decided on all the facts and circumstances. See text accompanying note 51
supra.
76. Cf. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1957) (the appellate court
found it impossible to determine whether appropriate standards had been employed by the
trial court in reaching its conclusion since the trial court opinion stated only a conclusion
without specifying its reasoning).
77. For a more extensive discussion of the concept of lack of independent exercise of voting
power, see notes 106-09 infra and accompanying text.
78. Contrary to the court's finding, the facts indicate that Newton-Chambers did participate
actively and independently in the management of KOS. See notes 112-13 infra and accompa-
nying text.
79. One problem with the regulation is that it does not discuss in any detail what constitutes
failure to exercise voting rights. See Waris, supra note 9, at 987 n.20. In the case of a corpo-
ration such as KOS, with shareholders who are located on different continents and who each
own several other companies, it would be unrealistic to insist on a perfect voting record to
demonstrate voting independence.
80. See note 108 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Boycott Provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, 42 Fed. Reg. 41,504, 41,511 (1977) (the existence of an agreement to participate ih a
boycott will not be inferred merely from the fact that a person's actions are apparently consis-
tent with the boycott requirements of a certain country).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2) (1963). For the text of this portion of the regulation, see
note 42 supra.
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non-United States shareholders. This portion of the regulation has not won
universal endorsement in the courts and has produced seemingly inconsis-
tent results.82 A comparison of the two most recent cases to consider the
regulation, CCA and Koehring, presents a striking example of the inconsis-
tent applications of the tri-test.
83
The present judicial confusion over measuring voting power under the
tri-test results at least in part from a failure to focus on the specific legisla-
tive history of section 957(a). In Garlock and Kraus, for example, the stock
transfers to non-United States shareholders were so obviously artificial that
the Second Circuit considered only general congressional statements re-
vealing an intent to eliminate tax havens.84 Weiskopf and CCA adopted
the Garlock and Kraus principles without making independent examina-
tions of congressional intent.
In examining legislative history, however, courts should not ignore spe-
cific provisions in favor of more broadly worded congressional state-
ments.85 Especially in dealing with Subpart F, a statute riddled with special
provisions and exceptions, a court should first look to the specific legislative
history of a particular section to determine its scope.8 6 In fact, the legisla-
tive history of Subpart F pertaining specifically to section 957(a) demon-
strates that Congress did not approve any of the conditions incorporated in
the tri-test. The following discussion examines both the foundation of
these conditions in section 957(a) and their soundness as determinants of
control, as illustrated by the divergent results reached in the CCA and
Koehring cases.
82. See notes 50-58 supra and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., text accompanying note 105 infra.
84. Neither the Garlock nor the Kraus opinion mentioned the specific legislative history of§
957 (except for one brief footnote in Garlock), although the Second Circuit did extensively
discuss Subpart F's general goal of eliminating tax deferral. 489 F.2d at 200-01; 490 F.2d at
900. But by concentrating on broad statements of policy the court begged the critical question
of what Congress intended should constitute control within the meaning of § 957(a).
85. See Whitlock v. Commissioner, 59 U.S. Tax Ct. 490 (1972), af'd in part and rev'd in
part, 494 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1974). The Tax Court in Whitlock was faced with determining
the relationship between the foreign personal holding company provisions, see note 92 infra,
and Subpart F. The court, rather than rely on the general purposes of Congress, narrowed the
scope of its inquiry to focus on the specific legislative history of the sections in question. 59
U.S. Tax Ct. at 501.
86. Subpart F underwent intensive legislative scrutiny and many revisions between its pro-
posal by President Kennedy and its final enactment. The revisions of the statute created many
exceptions to its general purposes. See Dougherty v. Commissioner, 60 U.S. Tax Ct. 917, 927
(1973); H. R. REp. No. 1447, supra note 26, at 57-58; S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 9, at 79-80.
Courts should therefore exercise restraint to avoid destroying the carefully formulated statu-
tory arrangement of Subpart F by looking only to the statute's general purposes.
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L Disparity Between Economic Interest and Voting Power
The first concurrent condition set forth in the tri-test is whether a dispar-
ity exists between the percentage of voting stock and the economic interest,
as indicated by the share of a corporation's earnings, held by non-United
States shareholders.8 7 The statute, however, does not mention economic in-
terest, but bases control solely on majority ownership of voting power.
8s
Significantly, the legislative history of section 957(a) demonstrates that the
House Ways and Means Committee considered and rejected a test of con-
trol that would have included an economic value factor.89 The Treasury
Department submitted a proposed draft bill which would have made
greater than 50 percent ownership of either voting power or stock value
conclusive proof of United States shareholder control,90 but the commit-
tee's first draft of the bill employed the voting power test as the sole deter-
minant of control.91
The committee feared that taxation of Americans on income of a foreign
corporation that was not American-controlled would be unconstitutional.
92
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-I(b)(2) (1963). For the text of this portion of the regulation, see
note 42 supra.
88. Tillinghast, United States Income Taxation of Foreign Source Income -A Survey of the
Pro visions and Problems, 29 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAx. 1, 25 (1971).
89. See generally Hearings, supra note 18, at 309-22.
90. U.S. Treas. Dep't Press Release D-186 (July 28, 1961), reprintedin [1961] 7 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. (CCH) 1 6479. Section 952 of the proposed draft stated, in relevant part:
For purposes of this subpart, the term "controlled foreign corporation" means any
foreign corporation-
I. of which more than 50 percent of-
(A) the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or
(B) the total value of shares of all classes of stock
is owned.. . by no more than 5 United States persons.
See Waris, supra note 9, at 185; Eigner, supra note 56, at 27.
91. H.R. 10650, &7th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13(a) (1962) (proposed I.R.C. § 954(a), as reported by
Comm. on Ways and Means), reprinted in 1 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE REVENUE AcT OF 1962, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1008 (1967).
92. The committee was uncertain whether United States shareholders would have received
income under the sixteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Committee members
Boggs and Byrne both questioned Secretary of the Treasury Dillon concerning the legal basis
for the Treasury's proposed method of taxation. Secretary Dillon responded that Subpart F
taxation would be based on the same principle as was used in the Revenue Act of 1937, see
note 6 supra, to justify taxation of foreign personal holding companies. Hearings, supra note
18, at 309-10, 342. The committee members refused to accept this analogy, since the foreign
personal holding company provisions had been enacted specifically to curtail flagrant tax
avoidance by the use of "incorporated pocketbooks" abroad. Id. at 342. Furthermore, even if
the analogy is valid, there is some uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the foreign personal
holding company provisions. See Horwich, The Constitutionality of Subpart F of the Internal
Revenue Code, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 400, 410 (1965). The Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the 1937 Act's taxation of undistributed profits, although the
Court cited the Act with approval in Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 288 n.4
(1938). But f Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (stock dividend not taxable to
shareholder as income since it did not give to shareholder any part of the company's assets).
See Horwich, supra at 404-05.
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The committee's concern led it to request memorandums93 on the legality
of the Treasury's proposed measure of control. The memorandum submit-
ted by the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
94
concluded that income does not arise out of the mere possibility of a future
claim for dividends. 95 Rather, realization of income occurs only when the
corporation distributes earnings to the taxpayer. 96 The committee settled
upon the voting power test of control because of its concern that no basis
would exist for taxing American shareholders unless those shareholders, by
themselves, held enough voting power to cause the declaration of divi-
dends.97 Congress thus made a deliberate decision to limit the test of con-
trol to voting power.98 The Treasury Department's introduction of an
economic value element into the regulation does not reflect this congres-
sional intent.99
Moreover, the presence of a greater percentage of voting power than eco-
nomic interest is not a reliable indicator of United States shareholder con-
trol of a foreign corporation, where the United States shareholders own less
than a majority of the corporation's actual voting power. CC4, Inc. v.
Commissionerl°° recognized this principle. In CCA, United States share-
holders of a foreign corporation transferred 50 percent of their voting stock
to foreign investors by issuing a new class of preferred stock for less than 50
percent of the corporation's net worth. 10 The board of directors was evenly
split between representatives of the common and preferred shareholders
93. Hearings, supra note 18, at 311, 313. The committee asked both the Treasury Depart-
ment and the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation to submit memoran-
dums which were incorporated into the record.
94. Pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 8001-8023, the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation assists the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee in
investigating and reporting on the operation of the federal tax laws.
95. Hearings, supra note 18, at 313.
96. This underlying principle of Subpart F taxation is analogous to constructive receipt of a
dividend. For the regulations governing constructive receipt, see Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1960).
97. Only then would Americans collectively have the power to appropriate the earnings of a
foreign corporation for themselves. Two cases which upheld the constitutionality of Subpart F
stressed the importance of this underlying principle. See Dougherty v. Commissioner, 60 U.S.
Tax Ct. 917, 928 (1973); Whitlock v. Commissioner, 59 U.S. Tax Ct. 490, 509 (1972).
98. Congress has utilized the value test where it felt the test appropriate. Value of stock is
the only test of control in I.R.C. §§ 382(b), 542(a)(2) and 1239(a). Voting power anda value
test of some kind are used in I.R.C. §§ 332(b)(1), 334(b)(2)(B), 368(c), 1033(a)(2) and 1504(a).
Voting power or value is the test in I.R.C. §§ 269(a), 304(c)(1), 503(b), 856(d)(2), 1246(b)(2),
1551(b), 1563(a), 1563(c)(2), 4915(b), and 6038(d)(1).
99. I.R.C. § 7805(a) grants to the Secretary of the Treasury the power to "prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title ...... Although a treasury
regulation is presumptively valid, a regulation that is inconsistent with the intent of Congress
is void and will not be upheld. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959).
100. 64 U.S. Tax Ct. 137 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1.
101. Id. at 153. The Tax Court stated. "We recognize that, as in the Kraus case, the
amount paid by the preferred shareholders for their stock was less than 50 percent of the net
worth of AG." Id.
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with neither group having the power to break deadlocks.'0 2 According to
the CCA court, the fact that the non-United States shareholders held a lim-
ited economic interest did not make the corporation a CFC, absent a
showing of actual restrictions on their voting power. Although the pre-
ferred shareholders "had a more limited interest to protect than the com-
mon shareholders" and their directors participated with less vigor in
corporate management, 10 3 the court found that they were willing to use the
powers they had to protect their interests.10 4 Therefore the foreign corpora-
tion did not meet the conditions of the tri-test and was not a CFC.
None of the other section 957(a) cases have adopted the CCA interpreta-
tion of the economic disparity doctrine. Koehring presented an ideal fact
situation for applying the CCA analysis, since-there the non-United States
shareholders held not just half but an outright majority of the voting power.
Yet the Koehring court failed to follow or even distinguish CCA, finding
that the corporation satisfied the economic disparity test as well as the other
conditions of the tri-test.
105
2. Lack of Independent Exercise of Voting Power
The second concurrent condition set forth in the tri-test is whether non-
United States shareholders have failed to exercise their voting rights inde-
pendently or at all.1°6 This element overlooks the fact that groups of share-
holders may better serve their mutual interests by voting similarly rather
than in opposition.10 7 Ironically, the Treasury Department recognized this
principle in its original proposed version of section 1.957-1(b)(2), which
stated in part: "The mere fact that any shareholder, in exercise of reason-
able business prudence, votes his stock in a manner consistent with the in-
terests of a United States shareholder will not in itself be deemed to
establish an understanding as to the voting of his stock."'1 8 Furthermore,
the difficulty of proving independent exercise of voting power where share-
holder voting records are similar in effect creates a presumption of share-
holder collusion.'0 9 Neither the statute nor the realities of the exercise of
102. Id. at 151.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 433 F. Supp. at 935.
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2) (1963). For the text of this portion of the regulation, see
note 42 supra.
107. Waris, supra note 9, at 987.
108. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2), 28 Fed. Reg. 829 (1963). The final draft of the
regulation did not contain this sentence. For a discussion of the differences between the pro-
posed and the final regulation, see Friedman & Silbert, FinalRegulations on Controlled Foreign
Corporations and Less Developed Country Corporations, 22 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX. 811, 816-
18 (1964).
109. Friedman and Silbert expressed fear that the Treasury Department would attempt to
read such a presumption into the regulation, although its language does not mandate the pre-
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voting power justify such a presumption, and it should not be a factor in
determining whether voting control exists.
The CCA decision recognized that the lack of independent exercise of
voting power is a questionable criterion for measuring control. The court,
rejecting the mere infrequent exercise of voting power as dispositive in de-
termining voting control, applied a test based on the opportunity to exercise
voting power.110 The Koehring court, again ignoring principles elucidated
in CCA, found that Newton-Chambers failed to exercise its voting power
consistently and independently."' The facts, however, indicate that
Newton-Chambers did exercise its voting power independently in gov-
erning KOS. For example, Newton-Chambers installed a majority of di-
rectors to represent its interest,112 and subsequently the Newton-Chambers
directors defeated a proposal by the Koehring directors to declare a divi-
dend on the common stock.1 3 The ability of the Newton-Chambers direc-
tors to defeat a proposal to declare a dividend is especially important in
light of congressional concern that American shareholders should become
subject to taxation under Subpart F only if they could cause the declaration
of dividends.14
The Koehring court brushed off the exercises of control by the Newton-
Chambers directors, stating that their "real interest lay in protecting the
Newton-Chambers stake in KOS. '' 115 But this simply confirms that
Newton-Chambers did exercise its voting power in its own behalf. The
court, in support of its conclusion that Newton-Chambers exercised its
voting power in accordance with the desires of Koehring, stressed the irreg-
ular participation of the Newton-Chambers directors at shareholders and
directors meetings. 16 But it did not reconcile this finding with the several
instances in which Newton-Chambers exercised its power to control KOS,
sumption. Friedman & Silbert, supra note 108, at 817. Waris expressed similar apprehension
that the regulation might create an automatic assumption of an implied agreement wherever
groups of shareholders cast their votes in harmony. Waris, supra note 9, at 987-88.
110. 64 U.S. Tax Ct. at 152. By looking to the opportunity to control, the CCA court was
able to distinguish Garlock, Kraus, and Weiskopf, each of which had applied the regulation
against the taxpayer. In those cases, the voting stock held by non-United States shareholders
was subject to several substantial restrictions which negated any real opportunity for those
shareholders to exercise their voting rights. Id. at 151. In contrast, the stock transferred to
non-United States shareholders in CC4 had no substantial restrictions.
111. 433 F. Supp. at 935.
112. The court overlooked this extremely important demonstration of control by Newton-
Chambers. Both the statute and the regulation speak of voting power of stock as the measure
of determining control. And according to H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 95 (2d ed. 1970),
the primary function of shareholder voting, along with approving extraordinary corporate ac-
tions, is to elect directors.
113. 433 F. Supp. at 933.
114. See notes 92-97 supra and accompanying text.
115. 433 F. Supp. at 933.
116. Id.
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nor did it point to a single corporate decision in which Newton-Chambers
did not participate.
3. The Princ#7al Purpose Test
The third concurrent condition set forth in the tri-test is whether a princi-
pal purpose of a voting stock transfer is to avoid CFC classification. 1 7 The
inclusion of this purpose element in measuring control infringes on the
right of taxpayers to arrange their transactions so as to minimize their tax
liability.118 Although some sections of the Internal Revenue Code specifi-
cally provide for the inclusion of a purpose test,' 19 Subpart F does not.
Courts have consistently interpreted sections of the Code that incorporate a
stock ownership test but not a purpose test as allowing a taxpayer to in-
crease or decrease his stock ownership to avoid taxation. 120 Moreover, the
Tax Court has recognized the legitimacy of deliberate attempts to avoid
Subpart F taxation.' 2' Therefore, a purpose test should not serve as a factor
in determining whether to recognize a transfer of voting stock to non-
United States shareholders.
IV
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF CONTROL
Whatever the method of determining CFC classification under Subpart
F, it should both comport with congressional intent and accurately reflect
the realities of voting control. Because the tests of control in section 1.957-
l(b)(2) do not fulfill these objectives, administrative or legislative action is
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2) (1963). For the text of this portion of the regulation, see
note 42 supra.
118. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
119. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 269(a), 367(a), 1492.
120. The line of cases under I.R.C. § 332 (originally enacted as Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1,
§ 112, 53 Stat. 37) illustrates this point well. For example, in Commissioner v. Day & Zim-
merman, Inc., 151 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945), the court held that a taxpayer's deliberate, bona fide
transfer of shares of stock in a subsidiary, enabling him to realize a loss on liquidation of the
subsidiary, was perfectly legitimate. See also Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670
(1st Cir. 1956); Avco Mfg. Co., 25 U.S. Tax Ct. 975 (1956).
121. The Tax Court in Kraus v. Commissioner, 59 U.S. Tax Ct. 681 (1973), aj'd, 490 F.2d
898 (2d Cir. 1974), stated:
It is apparent that the petitioners have attempted to. . . avoid the effect of the literal
language of section 957(a) ....
We have no doubt that the effects of being classified as a controlled foreign corpora-
tion have caused many U.S. shareholders to divest themselves of enough voting power
to avoid section 957(a). There is clearly nothing improper about such a purpose for
the divestiture.
Id. at 692-93. Accord, CCA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 U.S. Tax Ct. 137, 153 (1975). Accord-
ing to one commentator, if the principal purpose test penalizes a United States shareholder for
decreasing his participation in a foreign corporation, it is "unconstitutional without any
doubt." Rado, supra note 49, at 324.
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necessary to formulate an alternative approach to the determination of ac-
tual voting control.122
The spectrum of possible alternative measures of control is broad. On
the one hand, the replacement provision for the current regulation could
embody a strict, highly quantitative analysis of voting power, focusing only
on the percentages of voting stock commanded by United States and non-
United States shareholders.1 23 This type of test affords the advantage of
providing relative certainty as to tax status. But such a test is inflexible in
its application, producing an absolute determination in any case where its
formal requirements are met,124 even where formal voting power does not
approximate actual voting power.
At the other extreme, the determination of control could depend heavily
on the facts and circumstances of each case. 125 Although this approach has
the advantage of flexibility of application, it lacks any guiding principles
indicating the factors that are relevant to discerning control or how those
factors should be weighted. As a result, this approach would spawn judi-
cial confusion and inconsistent results, 126 preventing taxpayers from
knowing their tax status with certainty without a judicial determination.
A. A SAFE HARBOR
The proposed new measure of control should draw upon the advantages
of each of the above approaches--certainty and flexibility-to facilitate
both tax planning and tax administration. To provide an element of cer-
tainty, the replacement provision should include a safe harbor 127 -a defini-
tive rule which, if satisfied, would predetermine that a foreign corporation
122. Note, Taxation of Foreign Source Incom" Implications of CCA, Inc., 17 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 335, 358 (1976).
123. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-126, 1969-1 C.B. 218; note 130 infra. See also I.T. 3896, 1948-1
C.B. 72, declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 68-100, 1968-1 C.B. 576; note 73 supra.
124. See Kauder, International Allocations of Income: Problems of Administration and
Compliance, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1974) ("[t]he ideal allocation rule is one that provides
a precise quantitative guide. . ."); cf. Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Signfcance of Corpo-
rate Debt:.A CriticalAnalysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REv. 369, 578 (1971) (urging the use of
fixed rules and predetermined tax consequences only in extreme cases-where little uncer-
tainty would exist anyway).
125. For example, I.R.C. § 385 sets forth several factors that are to be taken into account in
determining whether an interest in a corporation is stock or indebtedness.
126. See Note, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking--The Debt-Equity Imbroglio and
Dislocations in Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1695, 1706-07 (1970). See
also Kauder, supra note 124.
127. A safe harbor is a "nonexclusive, arbitrarily defined area" where non-litigious taxpay-
ers can plan their affairs in confidence that certain tax consequences will result. Note, supra
note 126, at 1705. The Note further states: "For the adventurous taxpayer the law may leave
the possibility of litigation in the fringe areas ... but tax law should not compel taxpayers to
be adventurous." Id.
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is not a CFC.128 The safe harbor should utilize easily quantifiable measures
of voting power to create a nonexclusive, well-defined area where a tax-
payer willing to meet the requirements could rest assured that his interest in
a foreign corporation was effectively immunized from IRS scrutiny.' 29 Such
a safe harbor might include the following requirements: (1) non-United
States shareholders must own more than 50 percent of a foreign corpora-
tion's total voting stock; (2) the voting stock held by non-United States
shareholders must not be subject to any legal limitations on its free exercise
that are not also present on the stock held by United States shareholders;
and (3) the non-United States shareholders must in fact have elected a ma-
jority of the foreign corporation's board of directors. 130 The inclusion of
this quantitative test in the regulation would clarify for tax planners the
scope of section 957(a)'s application. United States shareholders would
know with relative certainty the extent to which they must decontrol to en-
sure that their foreign corporate interests are not classified as CFC's.
Since United States shareholders would find it very difficult to meet the
requirements of the safe harbor while at the same time retaining actual vot-
ing control, it is unlikely that the proposed test could be used for tax abuse
purposes. The problems surrounding the determination of control in a
deadlock corporation would not arise, since the test requires that United
States shareholders own less than 50 percent of the voting power. Nor
could the test be circumvented by dispersal of a majority of shares among
many non-United States shareholders leaving United States interests with
effective control, since non-United States shareholders must actually elect a
majority of the board of directors. Even if the United States shareholders
were initially able to maintain control, their position of dominance would
be a perilous one, since they could not even elect 50 percent of the board of
directors. In sum, United States shareholders whose purpose is to avoid
sacrificing actual control could not meet the requirements of the safe har-
bor.
128. At a minimum, the safe harbor should place the burden of proof on the Treasury. For
examples of other provisions that reverse the burden of proof, see I.R.C. §§ 534, 162(c)(1), and
7454.
129. Examples of other safe harbors appear throughout the Internal Revenue Code. See,
e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(d)(2) (1966) (providing that, for the purposes of I.R.C. § 483, no
part of any payment on account of the sale of property will be considered as unstated interest if
the contract provides for interest at a rate of at least six percent per annum).
130. In situations analogous to Subpart F the voting power of a class of stock has been
measured according to the percentage of directors the class could elect. Rev. Rul. 69-126,
1969-1 C.B. 218. The question in that ruling was whether the voting power necessary to
achieve affiliation status within the meaning of I.R.C. § 1504(a) had been met when the voting
stock was divided among common and preferred shareholders. The IRS ruled that "participa-
tion in the management of the subsidiary through election of the board of directors is the
criterion of the voting power in this case .... " Id.
SUBPA4RT F
B. THE REAL OPPORTUNITY TEST
The classification of foreign corporations falling in the middle ground
between the safe harbor and the statutory definition of a CFC should de-
pend on whether or not the non-United States shareholders have the real
opportunity to prevent United States shareholder domination of corporate
management.131 A court should focus its inquiry on factors indicating the
ability of non-United States shareholders to participate at least on equal
terms with United States shareholders in corporate affairs. The critical is-
sue is whether non-United States shareholders have the potential to exercise
voting control, not whether they have frequently demonstrated the equality
or supremacy of their voting power in the past.
In applying the real opportunity test, a court should first inquire whether
non-United States shareholders have the ability to elect at least half of a
foreign corporation's board of directors. 132 While section 1.957-1(b)(1) cur-
rently recognizes control of the board of directors as an important indicator
of voting power,133 the past section 957(a) cases have not relied on this
factor in situations involving multiple classes of stock, but instead have de-
pended on other parts of the regulation. A greater emphasis on the ability
to elect directors would better serve the policies underlying Subpart F.
Congress intended that American shareholders should only be taxed on a
foreign corporation's earnings if they have the ability to declare a dividend
prior to distribution. 134 Since corporation laws generally grant the board
of directors the power to declare dividends, 135 the ability to elect directors
should indicate very accurately the ability to command distribution of earn-
ings.
136
The real opportunity test would also authorize the examination of the
voting power of non-United States shareholders for legal restrictions that
131. Although neither incorporated in the regulation nor universally applied, real opportu-
nity as an element in determining control won judicial recognition in CCA, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 64 U.S. Tax Ct. 137 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 1. Theoretically, at least, the
Commissioner's acquiescence in CC4 should give the decision much the same effect as a regu-
lation. E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAExz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 55 (1976).
The Tax Court also mentioned the real opportunity test in Kraus v. Commissioner, 59 U.S.
Tax Ct. 681 (1973), aft' 490 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974). The court stated that "what is not
present in the instant case is any opportunity for the preferred shareholders to alter the course
of events, even if they suddenly became so inclined." Id. at 694.
132. Tillinghast, .supra note 88, at 26-27. But cf Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 U.S. Tax
Ct. 423, 438-39 (1972) (concurring opinion) (control of the board of directors should not be
considered dispositive of voting control).
133. Voting control will be attributed to United States shareholders "if they have the power
to elect, appoint, or replace a majority of that body of persons exercising, with respect to such
corporation, the powers ordinarily exercised by the board of directors of a domestic corpora-
tion." Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(1)(i) (1963).
134. See notes 92-97 supra and accompanying text.
135. H. HENN, supra note 112, at 665.
136. See note 130 supra.
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could operate to impair their ability to prevent United States shareholder
domination. Restrictions on the voting stock itself, such as call provi-
sions,137 express shareholder agreements, 38 or limitations imposed by the
corporation laws of a particular jurisdiction, 139 could significantly dilute
the nominal voting power of non-United States shareholders. Implied
agreements should contribute to determining real opportunity, but only
where the weight of the evidence indicates that the shareholders have
reached some understanding actually impairing non-United States share-
holder voting power, and that the United States shareholders have an effec-
tive means of enforcing the understanding."' 0 This might occur where the
facts indicate that the United States shareholders possess economic strangu-
lation power over the foreign corporation because they control suppliers
upon which the corporation depends for survival. 141
The real opportunity test of control would supply the tools for uncov-
ering transactions that meet the section 957(a) requirements in substance
but not in form, and would eliminate many of the problems which plague
the current regulation. For instance, the test would not require the actual
exercise of voting power in every corporate action taken, nor would it re-
quire dissimilar voting records between groups of shareholders. The eco-
nomic interest of non-United States shareholders and the principal purpose
of a voting stock transfer-factors which do not significantly affect the ac-
tual ability of non-United States shareholders to exercise their voting
power-would no longer contribute to the determination of control. Elimi-
nating from consideration those factors that are not directly related to
voting control would significantly alleviate the problems of current taxation
of United States shareholders on income not yet available, inconsistent ju-
dicial applications of section 957(a), and uncertainty in tax planning.
CONCLUSION
Treasury Regulation section 1.957-1(b)(2) is an inappropriate measure of
voting power for the purposes of Subpart F. The regulation is not entirely
consistent with Subpart F's statutory provisions or its legislative intent.
Furthermore, application of the regulation often fails accurately to deter-
mine actual voting control, causing courts to apply it inconsistently. In or-
der to impose Subpart F taxation in accordance with legislative intent and
to facilitate tax planning, the current regulation should be revised to in-
137. See, e.g., Kraus v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir. 1974).
138. See, e.g., Weiskopf v. Commissioner, 64 U.S. Tax Ct. 78, 95 (1975).
139. See Rev. Rul. 70-426, 1970-2 C.B. 157 (although in that case the law of the country of
incorporation gave neither group of shareholders a voting power advantage). For a brief
discussion of this Revenue Ruling, see note 55 supra and accompanying text.
140. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Weiskopf v. Commissioner, 64 U.S. Tax Ct. 78, 95 (1975); note 54 supra.
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dude a safe harbor. The residuum of cases involving a control issue should
undergo an analysis based on the real opportunity of non-United States
shareholders to participate at least equally with United States shareholders
in corporate management.
Andrew H. Shaw

